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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GULL LABORATORIES, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

:

Case No. 950481

:

Priority No. 15

v.
FLOYD E. WESTON dba METABOLIC
RESEARCH INSTITUTE and
FORMULA TECHNOLOGY, a Nevada
corporation,
:
Defendants and
Appellees.

Assigned from Utah Supreme
Court, Case No. 950132

:
:

Appellant Gull Laboratories, Inc. (hereinafter "Gull") hereby
submits this Reply Brief in response to the Brief of Appellees
submitted by Floyd E. Weston dba Metabolic Research Institute and
Formula Technology (hereinafter "Weston and Formula Technology").
I•
A.

ARGUMENT

AN ATTORNEY CAN BIND HIS CLIENT TO AN ORAL SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT
Weston and Formula Technology have cited both Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-51-32 and the case of John Deere Co. v. A&H Equipment, Inc..
876 P.2d 880

(Utah Ct. App. 1994), as limiting their attorney's

power to bind them in a settlement agreement.
disagrees.

1

Gull respectfully

Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-32(2) states that an attorney and
counselor has authority "to bind his client in any of the steps of
an actionable proceeding by his agreement filed with the clerk or
entered upon the minutes of the court, and not otherwise."
case

at

bar,

Mr.

Zoll

bound

his

clients

Weston

and

In the
Formula

Technology by making an oral stipulation which was entered upon the
minutes of the court.
are

permitted

Administration.

under

Such oral stipulations made on the record
Rule

4-504(8)

of

the

Code

of

Judicial

Thus Mr. Zoll was acting completely within the

parameters set by § 78-51-32 and cannot now claim that his actions
had no binding effect on Weston and Formula Technology.
Weston and Formula Technology misrepresent in their Brief what
this Court has stated regarding Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-32 and an
attorney's power to settle a matter on his client's behalf.

They

do this by citing only a portion of this Court's discussion on the
subject.

The following is the full quote from which Weston and

Formula Technology cite only a portion:
We do not believe, however, that § 78-51-32
was
intended
to
void
oral
settlement
agreements.
Clearly, the power to settle a
lawsuit resides in the client.
If a client
authorizes the attorney to settle the matter
and has expressed an intent to be bound by the
attorney's acts, absent a statute of frauds
issue,
an oral or privately
negotiated
settlement agreement is as valid as a signed,
written settlement agreement that has been
written on the minutes of the court.
2

John Deere Co. v. A&H Equipment, Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 886, n. 11
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
This Court has clearly stated the law in the State of Utah
regarding

settlements:

an

attorney

can

bind

a

client

to

a

settlement agreement, and oral settlement agreements are as valid
as signed, written agreements.

For these reasons, Weston and

Formula Technology must be held to the terms of the stipulation of
settlement entered into by their authorized agent on their behalf.
B.

TEE EXCUSABLE NEGLECT OF A PRINCIPAL IS NOT GROUNDS TO

SET ASIDE THE REINSTATED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Weston and Formula Technology allege in their brief that Gull
has

failed

to dispute

the trial court's

neglect on the part of Mr. Floyd Weston.
simple.
Technology

Floyd

Weston

was

not

the

and

himself

to

the

terms

settlement entered in open court.

finding

of

excusable

The reason for this is

agent
of

who
the

bound

Formula

stipulation

of

Mr. Ray Zoll was the agent

acting on behalf of these two principals at that time.

If there is

excusable neglect which would justify the setting aside of the
stipulation of settlement, that excusable neglect must be on the
part of Mr. Zoll, the authorized agent, and not on the part of the
principals, as claimed by Weston and Formula Technology.

In this

regard, Gull's attorney specifically asked the trial court whether
it found any excusable neglect on the part of Mr. Zoll.
court's response was:

The

"I'm not going to make a finding on that."
3

(R. at 834.)

Instead, the court found excusable neglect only on

the part of Mr. Weston.

(R. at 833.)

Herein lies the trial

court's error.
To claim that the stipulation of settlement should be set
aside because of excusable neglect on the part of one of the
principals disregards the very essence of principal-agent law, i.e.
that a principal is bound by the acts of its authorized agent.
Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat, 892 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Mr. Zoll, as an authorized agent, agreed to the stipulation of
settlement on his client's behalf.

If excusable neglect exists, it

must be grounded in his behavior and not the principals' . This is
particularly
Technology

true

ever

since

alleged

at

no

that

authority to settle the case.

time

Mr.

have

Zoll

Weston

was

not

and

Formula

clothed

with

To the contrary, it is clear that

Mr. Zoll had the full authority not only to represent Weston and
Formula Technology in procedural matters, but also in this instance
in discussing and agreeing to a settlement.

That authority having

been transferred to Mr. Zoll, Weston and Formula Technology are in
no position to argue that their agent went beyond the scope of his
authority,

by

understanding

settling
of

what

on
the

a

basis

settlement

different
would

be.

than
Under

their
the

circumstances of this case, there is no precedent in the State of

4

Utah which would permit the principals to be relieved of their
obligations as agreed upon by their agent.
C.

THE DATE FOR PAYMENT OF THE SETTLEMENT MONIES WAS FIXED AND
FIRM
Weston and Formula Technology consistently refer to the date

by which they obligated themselves to pay the settlement money as
an arbitrary and flexible date.

In so saying, they argue that

there was no fixed time for payment but that the date established
in the stipulation of settlement was merely a suggested time and
that somehow it did not matter whether they made the payment by
that time or by any other time.

The mere recitation of this

argument is sufficient to defeat it.
A review of the transcript of the stipulation of settlement
shows that Mr. Zoll agreed that the settlement payment would be
made to Gull within ten days.

(R. at 615.)

When Mr. Zoll started

to condition the commencement of the ten days upon the court's
order being signed, the court immediately confirmed that it was a
set date, ten days

from the hearing date.

Mr. Rust, Gull's

counsel, affirmed his agreement with the court by stating, "I think
we have an agreement here," meaning that the parties had agreed to
a payment date ten days from the date of the hearing and not ten
days from the date of the stipulation being signed by the judge.
(R. at 615.)

Mr. Zoll did not pursue any further his request that

5

the

money

should

be

paid

ten

days

from

the

date

a

written

stipulation was signed by the court.
The date for payment was clarified even further when Mr. Rust
pointed out that the payment date of October 1, 1994 fell on a
Saturday.

The court then stated that the date for payment should

be moved to the following Monday, October 3rd.

(R. at 616.)

There

was thus no guessing nor ambiguity regarding when the money was to
be paid.

It was specifically and unequivocally stated that the

payment would be made by the date set or else the consequences of
not paying would have to be met, namely that the full amount of the
previously entered summary judgment would have to be paid.

It is

clear from the record that Mr. Zoll fully understood that the money
had to be paid by October 3, 1994 at 5:00 p.m.
judgment would be reinstated.

or the prior

There are no credible grounds for

Weston and Formula Technology's claim that the payment date for the
settlement money was arbitrary and that time was not of the essence
under the stipulation.
D.

THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS
Weston and Formula Technology's repeated reference to the

confused

procedural

history

of

this

case

and

the

"confounded

judicial proceedings" only serve as a smoke screen to the real
issue

of whether

the

stipulation

unambiguous in its terms.

of settlement

was

clear and

Gull freely admits this case has had a
6

confused procedural history with several judges presiding over the
case.

However, the crux of this case involves but one hearing,

i.e. the hearing when the stipulation of settlement was made.

At

that one hearing there was but one judge present together with
representatives of both parties.
hearing

is

clear

and

The agreement reached at this

unambiguous

in

its

terms,

lacking

procedural confusion or confounded judicial proceedings.
and

Formula

consequences

Technology

must

not

be

allowed

to

any

Weston

escape

the

of their breach of the stipulation of settlement by

claiming confusion.
There is also no basis for Weston and Formula Technology's
claim

that

the

inadvertently.

stipulation

of

settlement

was

entered

into

A review of the stipulation demonstrates a clear

understanding on Mr. Zoll's behalf that he was binding his clients.
Finally, Weston and Formula Technology cannot claim that Gull
is seeking a windfall based on a technicality by requesting that
the summary judgment be reinstated.

The trial court clearly states

during the stipulation that, "in the event there is a default, then
Mr. Rust can submit an affidavit that it wasn't paid; judgment may
then enter
responds:
at 616.)

as previously

entered by Judge Moffat."

Mr

"Yes. And Mr. Rust prepare the dismissal papers?"

Zoll
(R.

The parties mutually agreed to the penalty should Weston

and Formula Technology breach the terms of the stipulation.
7

E.

GULL HAS FULLY PRESERVED ALL ISSUES RAISED IN THIS APPEAL
Weston and Formula Technology claim that the issue of whether

Judge Hyde

could vacate

his previously

entered

order was not

properly preserved at the trial level and cannot now be raised for
the first time on appeal.

Without citing any authority in support

of their position, Weston and Formula Technology simply state that
Gull

did

not

"object"

to

Judge

Hyde's

order

rescinding

the

reinstated summary judgment and therefore cannot argue against the
rescission on appeal.

Gull respectfully submits that there is no

requirement that such an objection be made.

The only objection

that could have been made was a motion for reconsideration or an
interlocutory appeal, neither of which courts view with favor.
preservation

of

the

issue

of

whether

Judge

Hyde

could

The
have

rescinded the judgment is that it was ruled upon and the time for
appealing from the ruling did not commence until there was a final
disposition of the entire case. There is no question that Gull has
timely appealed from the final disposition of the case. Therefore,
the issue has been properly preserved for appeal.
II.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, Gull respectfully requests
that both Judge Rigtrup's order of March 9, 1995 finding excusable
neglect

on the part

of Mr. Weston and Judge Hyde's order of

February 8, 1995 setting aside summary judgment against Weston and
8

Formula Technology be vacated, and that Judge Hyde's order of
November

18, 1994 granting Gull's motion

for reinstatement

of

summary judgment and the subsequent summary judgment dated December
2, 1994 against Weston and Formula Technology and in favor of Gull
in the amount of $38,842.74 plus interest be reinstated.
Respectfully submitted,
DATED this

/(

day of September, 1995.
KESLER 8c RUST

'£ph C/ Rust
orneys for Appellant
1 Laboratories, Inc.
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